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Abstract: In his paper, "Narration in International Human Rights Law," Joseph R. Slaughter argues 
that the prohibitions and entitlements articulated in international human rights law presume and 
promote an image of the human being as a self-narrating subject. He proposes that human rights law 
enshrines commitments to the human voice and to the ability of the individual to construct narratives 
of identity. In this sense, human rights violations can be understood as assaults on the human voice 
and on the socio-cultural structures that make certain kinds of narratives and narration possible. This 
narratological reading of the law offers a way to recast, or complicate, the tension between the two 
poles of universalism and relativism that have dominated the human rights debate for a few decades. 
To demonstrate the centrality of narration to the human rights regime, Slaughter examines a 
particularly troublesome historical event that has renewed resonance today: the French practice of 
torture during the Algerian Revolution. Under torture, the voice is a primary site of repression, but, he 
suggests, torture is only an extreme example of the ways in which human rights violations generally 
attempt to disarticulate a free speaking, or narrating, subject. 
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Joseph R. SLAUGHTER 
 
Narration in International Human Rights Law 
 
"The question of identification is never the affirmation of a pregiven identity, never a self-fulfilling 
prophecy -- it is always the production of an image of identity and the transformation of the subject in 
assuming that image" (Bhabha 45); "International human rights law codifies the rights of the 
individual in increasingly concrete and justiciable form, and reflects international consensus on the 
inviolability of the individual and on the urgency of enforcement of human rights that flow from that 
consensus" (Maran 3): the two epigraphs that thus preface this article (the first taken from the field of 
contemporary literary and philosophical theory and the second from that of the international human 
rights law community) point to a central, but often underexamined, conception of human rights in 
contemporary society. Where Homi Bhabha identifies the production of human subjectivity as a 
psycho-metaphysical process of "assuming" an image of identity, Rita Maran suggests that 
international consensus, as codified in international human rights law, constructs a juridical 
subjectivity based on the premise of human dignity, "the inviolability of the individual." Examining the 
nature of the conflict between these two points of view, this paper will attempt to demonstrate the 
fruitfulness of a cross-disciplinary approach to understanding and formulating contemporary human 
rights policy and law. From its inception, human rights law has relied on both philosophical inquiry 
into, and sociological understanding of, the nature of human subjectivity, whether explicitly expressed 
or implicitly referenced. The nature of our understanding of human subjectivity is central to any 
thorough discussion of human rights (recent debates over universality and cultural relativism have 
focused specifically on the nature of human subjectivity, see, e.g., An-Na'im).  
I treat these competing conceptions of human subjectivity -- a subjectivity based in inherent 
human traits and one that resides in a determinative process -- as they influence, reflect, and respond 
to international consensus in the development of human rights law. Specifically, I analyze a 
particularly troublesome, yet resonant, historical event in order to contribute to the ongoing discussion 
of international human rights conceptions. A rough sketch of contemporary legal theorizations as they 
construct and reflect current conceptions of subjectivity will introduce a number of arguments about 
human rights, and how they should be understood in a post Cold War, post-colonial era. This 
discussion will lead to the proposition that human rights in general, and human rights law in 
particular, can be productively formulated in terms of narrative genres and narrative voices. 
Offering a detailed example of how human rights function as narrative constructions, this article 
will analyze the specific human rights violation of torture as practiced by the French in the historical 
context of the Algerian Revolution (1954-1962; there is numerous documentation on the 
pervasiveness of torture during the Algerian War, see, e.g., Mellor; Vidal-Naquet; Horne). The decision 
to examine torture is not completely arbitrary. As a human rights violation, torture is paradigmatic in 
its implementation as a tool to destroy a speaking subject. Human rights violations target the voice, 
and therefore, the voice should be the focus of international human rights instruments. This can be 
demonstrated by examining the details of other violations: the repression against Rigoberta Menchú 
by the Guatemalan Army in the late 1980s; the illegal detention of Jacobo Timerman in Argentina 
during the late 1970s; or the recent execution of Kenule Saro-Wiwa by the Nigerian government. 
However, the details of the torture of civilians in Algeria by the French military and the colonial 
administration allow for a particularly dynamic investigation of the narrative of human rights because 
the torture occurred concurrently with UN General Assembly calls to end colonialism. Additionally, the 
state that was practicing torture was influential in the codification of international human rights norms 
and publicly prided itself on its dedication to those norms. 
 In contemporary human rights discussions, many individuals in the international community 
have offered rubrics of rights that attempt to account for the evolving nature of international norms 
protecting human rights. These rubrications evidence the desire of the international community to 
develop a coherent, consistent justification for and definition of the "rights of man." The recent works 
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of three theorists have been influential in this endeavor: Burns Weston, Richard Falk, and Adeno 
Addis. While the three thinkers differ in their approaches to understanding human rights, their rubrics 
all rely, to some degree, on conceptions of human subjectivity and dignity as universal and 
fundamental. Burns Weston, outlining current human rights thought, argues that "regardless of their 
ultimate origin or justification, human rights are understood to represent individual and group 
demands for the shaping and sharing of power, wealth, enlightenment, and other cherished values" 
(17). Weston elaborates by adding four points of clarification to his schema; "reflecting varying 
environmental circumstances, differing worldviews, and inescapable interdependencies within and 
between value processes, human rights refer to a wide continuum of value claims ranging from the 
most justiciable to the most aspirational." Also, characterizing contemporary human rights theories, 
he adds that "if a right is determined to be a human right it is quintessentially general or universal in 
character, in some sense equally possessed by all human beings everywhere." Contemporary human 
rights are, Weston notes, generally "qualified by the limitation that the rights of any particular 
individual or group in any particular instance are restricted as much as is necessary to secure the 
comparable rights of others and the aggregate common interest" (18). And finally, he claims that 
"human rights are commonly assumed to refer, in some vague sense, to 'fundamental' as distinct from 
'nonessential' claims or 'goods'" (18). Weston's arguments, while not completely without prescriptive 
value, certainly tend to bear out as descriptive of the process by which an international consensus 
forms on the nature of contemporary human rights. That is, Weston's schema describes the process 
that results in contemporary conceptions of human rights. Weston does not, in this article, account for 
the very real possibility that his five observations may only be true because the West has been 
instrumental in the articulation of human rights norms. Adopting the Czech-French jurist Karel Vasak's 
schema of the "three generations of human rights," Weston proceeds to rubricate the rights 
elaborated in international law under the "three normative themes of the French Revolution … [which] 
are the first generation of civil and political rights (liberté); the second generation of economic, social, 
and cultural rights (égalité); and the third generation of newly called solidarity rights (fraternité)" 
(Vasak qtd. in Weston 18). The advantage of this descriptive schema, Weston tells us, is that it 
accounts for the various synchronic international declarations of human rights. The generational 
nature of these rights is not meant to advance one set over another. Rather, the generational schema 
offers an heuristic to explain the historical evolution of Western commitments to individual and to 
group rights, even when that evolution occurs synchronically and appears as competing relativist 
conceptions. 
 Richard Falk takes a more polemical approach in his attempt to organize the "logic of human 
rights." Falk divides his "schools of logic" into six categories: statist, hegemonial, naturalist, 
supranationalist, transnational, and populist. Statist logic, according to Falk, privileges the sovereignty 
of international borders over the rights of the individual (32). Statist logic makes human rights 
properly the concern of the sovereign state. Hegemonial logic supports "the supposition that there is 
some implicit correlation between power and virtue giving powerful states a mandate to impose their 
will on weaker states and that, on balance, this works out positively" (35). Naturalist logic, according 
to Falk, provides support for human rights because it validates "in the most fundamental way certain 
minimum standards of behavior" (37). He regards naturalist logic as "the essential ground for claiming 
that human rights are universally valid" (35). Falk identifies the General Assembly of the United 
Nations as the "main global arena of supranationalist logic," which appeals to an international moral 
authority above the interests of individual states (37). According to Falk's schema, transnational logic 
orders the world into various groups of independent, unaffiliated nongovernmental organizations 
whose human rights work is predicated on the "initiation of a stimulus in one state so as to have an 
impact elsewhere" (38). Finally, populist logic, the most potentially subversive and powerful in his 
formulation, provides the justification for individuals acting alone, or in transnational, cross-cultural 
collectives, to prevent and redress human rights abuses (39). 
Falk's divisions of human rights logic move beyond Weston's model in that they account for the 
process by which human rights instruments are produced. Where Weston provides a taxonomy that 
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acknowledges the evolutionary nature of human rights, Falk's schema stresses that "the protection of 
human rights … is an outcome of struggle between opposed social forces and cannot be understood 
primarily as an exercise in law-creation or rational persuasion" (32). Falk's approach to "the protection 
of human rights" seems to hold true for the normative instruments of international law that prohibit 
certain abuses and protect certain rights. However, his polemic moves towards a more problematized, 
contentious definition of human rights than Weston's schema; hence, Falk offers the possibility that 
human rights may develop out of competing individual, state, and corporate interests. Falk's 
recognition of the competitive process by which contemporary human rights are produced begins to 
recognize the complex subject of human rights, the individual human being. Adeno Addis goes further 
in treating the complexities of individual subjectivity by analyzing the arguments arising from 
competing communitarian and individualist ideological approaches to human rights. Addis shows the 
limitations inherent in restrictive ideologies and offers an alternative with what he calls a "post-
modern" approach to human rights (1252). Addis locates individual subjectivity in a complex web of 
communal and traditional influences and pressures. He argues that contemporary individualism, which 
either contends that the individual is the only moral agent, or that the "notion of group rights" is a 
different category of rights, "embraces the Enlightenment's assumption of a universal, stable, and to a 
large extent, pre-social, individual identity" (1237). This conception of the individual is, for Addis, too 
rigidly grounded in a conception of the subject that "is at variance with what social life teaches us" 
(1244). Addis' comments recognize the complexity of current theories of human subjectivity; the 
subject's identity is bound up in an extremely complex relationship with the community, with tradition, 
and with history. The subject of human rights law is a subject that is ephemerally caught up in what 
Bhabha calls "the production of an image of identity" (45). 
Addis continues his critique of individualism, noting that "the narrative of the presocial and 
autonomous self, the heroic individual, who stands against the threat of society, and whose 
confrontation with society is to be assisted with the notion of rights is a misleading one" (1244). The 
notion of the "heroic individual" pits that individual against society without recognizing her as both a 
product of and a participant in that society. The narrative of the individual hero invested with inherent 
dignity who overcomes restrictions and obstacles through sheer force of dignified will is, in Addis's 
formulation, archaic and naive. "The cultures and tradition that surround the individual are ones that 
enable her to continue to tell stories about herself, and make it possible for her to continue to make 
choices and define her life" (1246). In Addis's conception, only the existence of a collective makes 
individual narrative possible. In light of Addis's critiques of individualism, the subject addressed in 
human rights law is arguably a modern subject (by "modern," I am referring to the historical period 
from the Enlightenment to the present in which a "new" human was conceived from the philosophical 
works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and René Descartes). International human rights law describes and 
promotes a universal, stable, unified, and knowable subject who has clearly delimited boundaries and 
interests. According to this conception of the individual, the subject knows what she wants, knows 
how to get it, and only human rights abuses stand in her way. More explicitly, this subject is the hero 
of her own personal narrative of human dignity, enlightenment, and liberation. Addis argues that this 
conception of the juridical subject contradicts reality because "once the individual is seen to be at least 
partially constituted by the tradition to which she belongs, those narratives the group tells about itself, 
both to itself and others, then the fate of the individual is tied to the fate of the group and tradition" 
(1246). Further, "one cannot have a right as an abstract individual. Rather, one has a right as a 
member of a particular group and tradition, and within a given context" (1246). Addis's formulation of 
the individual more adequately describes the post-modern condition of human subjectivity and human 
narrative capacity that Fredric Jameson, François Lyotard, and Jean Baudrillard have theorized. Addis's 
identification of the individual's complex relationship to the world, by way of the community and 
tradition, can be redeployed to offer a different descriptive formulation of human rights, one that 
focuses on the voice of the juridical subject and the possibility of narration. That is, stressing the voice 
of the subject, positing the voice as an emblem of subjectivity, allows for a conception of human rights 
that does not rely upon some essential, inherent human quality. Reconceiving notions of human rights 
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in terms of narratability offers some departure from the double bind of universalism and 
fundamentalism. While this reformulation is intended to be descriptive, it could also serve as a 
benchmark to determine the value of a human right in any historically, culturally, spatially specific 
context. As conceptions of the speaking subject change, whether over time or across cultures, so too 
must conceptions of human rights that guarantee the subject's ability to narrate herself. 
International human rights norms, even as they cling to Enlightenment ideals of bourgeois 
individuality, have evolved in tandem with changing sociological and philosophical conceptions of 
individuality and human subjectivity. The early, albeit extended, period of codification of civil and 
political rights -- from the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (DRMC) in 1789 
to the United Nation's Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Universal Declaration) in 1948 -- also 
saw the rise of the realist modern novel and the modern hero. Mikhael Bakhtin, the Russian literary 
theorist, identifies the primary elements of most modernist novels: "given all the possible differences 
in construction, in the image of the hero itself there is neither movement nor emergence. The hero is 
that immobile and fixed point around which all movement in the novel takes place" (10). The 
treatment of the novel's hero, the fixed point around which all movement occurs, makes the individual 
the measure of all things. Against all odds and in all circumstances, the individual naturally perseveres 
in maintaining its structural and psychical integrity. However, seen from a legal perspective, it could 
be argued that in the modern Bildungsroman (the coming-of-age novel, or the novel of formation; see 
Abrams 119-20), restrictions to "liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression" (DRMC art. 
2) severely limit an individual's ability to remain "fixed." In accordance with the subjectivity reflected 
in international human rights norms, the fixity of the modern hero depends on his/her ability to 
narrate his/her story. In this formulation, a human rights abuse is characterized as an infringement on 
the modern subject's ability to narrate her story. To support this proposition, this article examines 
specifically the destruction of the voice and individual subjectivity under the application of torture. The 
"negative rights," those for which the state needs to prohibit certain actions such as torture and 
disappearance, qualify as human rights because they attempt to guarantee the liberty of the subject 
to speak and, more specifically, to speak freely. ("Negative rights" have been defined by the 
perception that some rights merely require a government to prohibit certain destructive abuses. 
"Positive rights" generally require active promotion. Thus, prohibitions against torture are negative 
rights, and programs of social welfare are positive rights.) If human rights abuses exist on a 
continuum of narratability, with oppressive voicelessness on one end and bellicose vociferousness on 
the other, human rights instruments and norms can be evaluated and promoted for their effectiveness 
in addressing that continuum and providing a public, international space that empowers all human 
beings to speak. 
 Before examining the French situation in Algeria and the role of the voice in contemporary 
human rights, we must understand the philosophical grounding of the French and international human 
rights traditions. Many contemporary philosophers and human rights experts have noted that "the 
French doctrine of rights was a heritage from the philosophers of the Enlightenment; they enunciated 
the doctrine of the 'rights of man' that became embodied in French law as well as in French culture" 
(Maran 3). The DRMC embodies the philosophical conception of the human subject as inherently 
invested with dignity. The 1789 "rights of man," while referring only to men, declared the universality 
of the dignity of man. This conception of man, codified after the French Revolution, directly confronted 
the authority of the sovereign. Whereas previously the Monarch, or President, retained the power to 
grant status to individual human beings, the DRMC conferred upon each individual the special "dignity" 
of being human. Therefore, in the preamble to the DRMC, the "representatives of the French people . . 
. consider[ ] that ignorance, forgetfulness, or contempt of the rights of man are the sole causes of 
public misfortunes and of the corruption of governments." 
The DRMC proceeds to guarantee the universality of human dignity, at least within the boundaries 
of the French state. In Article 1, the national assembly declares: "men are born and remain free and 
equal in rights; social distinctions can be established only for the common benefit." Article 2 declares 
that the duty of every "political association is the conservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights 
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of man; these rights are liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression." Further, the DRMC 
elaborates specific protections for the assurance of individual actualization of these rights. It prohibits 
arbitrary arrest in Article 7, and penalties that are not "strictly and clearly necessary" in Article 8. It 
supports due process in Article 9, and freedom of thought, religion, and speech in Articles 10 and 11. 
The fundamental prohibitions and guarantees established in the DRMC became the basis for French 
domestic law and for French participation in the creation of international human rights law. In her 
analysis of the influence of the French DRMC on the UN's Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
Maran explains that "the notion of universality within the [Universal Declaration] … owes a debt to 
France's notion of universality which, conversely, France considered uniquely its own, concerned with 
French values and culture, and not adaptable for international usage" (142). Despite this proprietary 
notion of universality, the French were instrumental in shaping both the Charter of the United Nations 
and the Universal Declaration. 
The eminent French jurist René Cassin played a major role in drafting the Universal Declaration. 
Cassin revealed the importance of the French philosophical conception of universality in the 
codification of human rights when, in 1972, he credited the DRMC with heralding and declaring a new 
understanding of humanity: "the Declaration of the Rights of the Man and of the Citizen, the essence 
of which the French Revolution caused to permeate most other civilized countries, truly marked a new 
era in the history of humanity" (qtd. in Maran 61). While Cassin's statement gives credit to the French 
for basic international notions of human rights, it also implicitly, and rather benignly, acknowledges 
the process by which the "new era" came to "civilized countries." His statement leaves room for an 
interpretation of human rights that places the "burden" of the dissemination of a new concept of man 
on those societies that consider themselves civilized. The burden of that universality appears in the 
language of the Universal Declaration. Recalling the words of the DRMC, the second preambular 
paragraph of the Universal Declaration considers the continued dangers of not codifying human rights 
and stresses human aspirations: "Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in 
barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which 
human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been 
proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people." In adopting the Universal Declaration, 
the UN General Assembly agreed that the first benefit from the protection of human rights is a "world 
in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech." The freedom of speech, the liberty to tell one's 
story, is precisely what the following thirty articles of the Universal Declaration attempt to ensure 
through prohibitions of abuses that tend to destroy the human voice -- "negative rights" -- and 
through promotions of social welfare that tend both to encourage and to foster the human voice 
speaking itself -- "positive rights." Besides prohibiting torture, arbitrary arrest, and slavery, the 
Universal Declaration evidences its commitment to Addis' conception of the individual subject when, 
acknowledging the individual's responsibilities to the community and to respect other's individual 
rights, it declares that the community is where "the free and full development of his personality is 
possible" (Art. 29). Article 29 commits the member states of the United Nations to a narrative of the 
development of the individual, to a narrative of becoming against the backdrop of the community. 
 In her book Barred: Women, Writing and Political Detention, Barbara Harlow argues that the 
thirty articles of the Universal Declaration "translate[] the standard literary paradigm of individual 
versus society … recharting the trajectory and peripeties of the classic Bildungsroman" (252-53). The 
classic narrative of becoming pits the individual against her immediate society, but the Universal 
Declaration places the individual "within a specifically international construction of rights and 
responsibilities." Along with this new international setting, the General Assembly, in the third 
preambular paragraph to the Universal Declaration, recognizes the promotion of the voice in an 
international context as a constructive alternative to the narrative of the individual physically 
compelled "to rebellion against tyranny and oppression."  
 Given France's historical and international commitments to human rights, its domestic 
practices during the colonization of Algeria and the Algerian Revolution would seem to be an 
aberration. However, Maran argues that the same ideology and philosophy that produced the "rights 
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of man" led to French human rights abuses. According to Maran, the United Nation's philosophical 
concept of universality in the Universal Declaration was "a by-product of France's proprietary sense of 
'universality'" (142). Maran's insightful identification of France's sense of universality as proprietary 
underpins her argument that both the contemporary notion of human rights and the French 
justification for the mission civilisatrice -- France's process of "domestication" and "pacification" of 
other peoples in other cultures -- arose from the Enlightenment's conception of the individual, of 
human subjectivity. In the context of human rights, the application of universality was, at least 
originally, peculiarly limited to the French male citizen. More recently, legal and literary theorists have 
extended and elaborated the notions of proprietary universality that France used to justify colonialism 
to itself. Abdullahi Ahmed Ah-Na'im, in his article analyzing the differences between Western and non-
Western conceptions of human dignity, argues that states which routinely violate human rights, 
"[e]ven when motivated by selfish ends," rationalize their conduct as "consistent with, or conducive 
to, some morally sanctioned purpose" (19). This process of rationalization often supplies the initial 
justification for human rights abuses and the subsequent defense of those abuses. 
The French relied upon the concept of universality, as a preparatory rationalization for their 
"civilizing mission," to argue that the Arab Algerians needed to be assimilated as beneficiaries of the 
French cultural legacy of Enlightenment ideals. Thus, the benefits of French culture justified the crimes 
of colonialism through the mission civilisatrice. While a complete listing of the crimes associated with 
colonialism would be impossible, Frantz Fanon, a psychiatrist from Martinique assigned to an Algerian 
hospital during the revolution, gives a sweeping description: "colonialism is not satisfied merely with 
holding a people in its grip and emptying the native's brain of all form and content. By a kind of 
perverted logic, it turns to the past of the oppressed people, and distorts, disfigures, and destroys it" 
(210). In his examination of the destruction of the colonized's past, Fanon's formulation explains a 
colonial process that attempts to destroy the speaking subject, both as an individual and in 
community. But, more insidiously, colonialism targets the entire complex matrix of subject 
construction, leaving the individual without content and context.  
French intellectual Jules Roy, in a memoir of his return visit to Algeria, attests to the power of the 
ideology of the civilizing mission when he remarks of his childhood as a colonist that "one thing I knew 
because it was told to me so often, was that the Arabs belonged to a different race, one inferior to my 
own. We had come to clear their land and bring them civilization" (17). Many other inhabitants and 
participants in colonial Algeria have similarly attested to this French attitude towards the Arab 
Algerians. Important in the conception of inferiority is the idea that Arab Algerians, according to the 
propriety of the French definition of universal human dignity, were not yet ready fully to claim their 
"rights of man" because they were "subhuman," and therefore universality did not apply to them. The 
"civilizing mission" was, in part, conceived as an attempt to bring Arab Algerians philosophically, 
sociologically, and socially "up" to the level of French civilization. Thus, when Jules Roy questioned one 
of the commanders of the French forces in 1960 about the brutal repression conducted in the colonial 
war, the commander responded: "we're after nobler things than oil . . . we're fighting for a certain 
notion of what man is. We're fighting to raise the standard of living of the people here, to distribute 
the land in their interests, to keep them linked to us materially and spiritually, so that our influence 
will endure" (84). This "influence" must be understood, in light of the "civilizing mission," as part and 
parcel of an education in the philosophical grounding of human rights; remnants of this colonial 
educational process persists in the language of the Universal Declaration itself, the opening paragraph 
proclaiming that "every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in 
mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms . . . 
both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under 
their jurisdiction" (preamble). Maran formulates the colonial process of education in terms of the 
individual's maturation. She argues that "the colonized could not reach adulthood under colonialism, 
despite the fact that to make him into 'man' was a key legitimizing doctrine of colonialism -- its 
'educational' mission" (5). Her formulation relies on an understanding of the narrative process by 
which one becomes "man," by which the hero moves through the plot of the Bildungsroman. Both in 
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Maran's argument and in French theoretical approaches to human rights, a subject "becomes man" 
when he/she has the ability and the freedom to express her individual subjectivity, to tell his/her 
story. 
 Jean-Paul Sartre, in his introduction to Frantz Fanon's The Wretched of the Earth, stresses the 
importance of the voice in the modern narrative of the individual as hero: "we only become what we 
are by the radical and deep-seated refusal of that which others have made us" ("Preface" 17). To 
refuse radically "that which others have made us," certain guarantees are necessary, guarantees that 
ensure the right to speak. Sartre's "refusal" suggests that the voice is the primary tool of subject 
construction, and he says about Fanon that "in short, the Third World finds itself and speaks to itself 
through his voice" (10). The "Third World," having had its other organs of speech brutally suppressed, 
according to Sartre, narrates its oppositional existence to the "First World" through the voice of Fanon. 
Fanon himself explains that one of the characteristic psychological disorders that he dealt with 
regularly in Algeria, and that he attributes to colonial crimes, was the loss of narrative ability in his 
patients (262). The destruction of the voice that finds itself and speaks itself, the voice that offers the 
counter-narrative of the "Third World" subject, is precisely the homogenizing project of colonialism. 
Addis reformulates the "civilizing mission" in terms of assimilation, where a voice, even if a relatively 
foreign one, is available to the subject: "philosophically, assimilation is seen to be desirable, for once 
the assimilation process is completed, then, so the argument goes, it will be easier to treat every one 
as an individual rather than as a member of a group" (1238).  
 Because of the French colonial commitment to the story of "becoming man," France 
considered its civilization one of the most enlightened and universal. Jules Roy shows how 
representatives of the international community felt about "the Algerian Question." Speaking with an 
unnamed Swedish man while visiting Algerian refugees in Tunisia, Jules Roy found himself 
insufficiently capable of responding to the man's astonishment: "But France is the symbol of an 
intelligent nation . . . and up till now your prestige has been based on the fact that the French were 
the first to defend the rights of man" (106). Roy concurred and had to admit that because of the 
Algerian situation, France had lost its role of leadership in the United Nations. French problems at the 
United Nations started because France considered its troubles with Algeria to be domestic problems. 
The assimilation of Algeria was in fact a French domestic legal question for more than a hundred 
years. Algeria was successively proclaimed "to be part of the French possessions" in 1834, divided into 
"Three French Departments" in 1870, and declared part of Metropolitan France in 1946 (Alwan 4; see 
also Kiss 130). Therefore, the United Nations, according to French arguments relying on Article 2(7) of 
the UN Charter, had no business interfering in the affairs of a sovereign nation. Despite René Cassin's 
commitment to the rights he helped draft in the Universal Declaration, in a speech before the General 
Assembly in 1950, he argued that colonial questions could not involve France's interests in Algeria 
because they could not involve "certain elements of the French Union that are under the same regime 
as the metropole" (qtd. in Kiss 395). However, as Harlow has noted of the Universal Declaration, the 
setting for the Algerian story of "becoming" had shifted to an international stage in 1960. 
In 1961, the French legal scholar Maurice Flory, in his yearly recap of important international 
legal events, identified the successful adoption of UN Resolution 1514(XV), the Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, as the result of Algeria's work in the 
international forum: "The French Army continue to fight against the rebellion, while the Army of 
National Liberation (ALN) conducts an international war" (Flory 836; the Declaration on the Granting 
of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples passed in the context of the Cold War. The Soviet 
Union proposed the matter for inclusion, and the United States responded by directing attention to the 
Soviet Union's incorporation of the world's "three newest colonies"—Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia. In 
the end, the major colonial powers and their empathizers, including France, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States, abstained from the vote.). While the ALN cannot claim victory for the passage of 
Resolution 1514, the Algerians were fairly successful at using the new setting laid out in the Universal 
Declaration to change the plot of their story. Soon after the beginning of the "Algerian War" in 1954, 
twenty-nine Asian and African nations at the Bandung Conference declared "support for the rights of 
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the peoples of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia to self-determination and independence" (Alwan 95). In 
1955, at the United Nations 10th General Assembly, a number of States unsuccessfully pushed for 
"the Algeria Question" to be included on the agenda. These nations gathered support for the inclusion 
of "the Algeria Question" over the next few years. Finally, in 1957, the General Assembly took up the 
question and passed Resolution 1012(XI), which expressed "the hope that, in the spirit of co-
operation, a peaceful, democratic and just solution would be found, through appropriate means, in 
conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations" (88). 
In 1958, the General Assembly expressed its desire for France and Algeria to enter into 
pourparlers. In 1960, the Soviet Union pushed for a resolution granting broad independence to 
colonial peoples. Even though the lines of debate were drawn in the Cold War East-West tradition, 
Resolution 1514(XV) passed, with most of the colonial powers abstaining. Resolution 1514(XV) 
committed the international community to the promotion of self-determination and the right to 
narration as an oppressed nation when the General Assembly declared in Article 5 that immediate 
action shall be undertaken "to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories, without any 
conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire . . . in order to 
enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom" (art. 5). Further, the United Nations 
recognized the need to undermine the logic of the civilizing mission, declaring in Article 3 that 
"inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext 
for delaying independence." Mohammed Bedjaoui, citing other legal arguments, claims that the 
Algerian War had a crucial influence on Resolution 1514(XV) and independence movements in general. 
(11): "the revolutionary liberation movement of Algeria has acted as a bloodstained lever for the 
consistent advancement of the anticolonial cause throughout Africa." On 19 December 1960, 
addressing specifically "the Question of Algeria" just five days after the approval of Resolution 1514, 
the General Assembly adopted Resolution 1573(XV), recognizing in Article 1 "the right of the Algerian 
people to self-determination and independence." The following year, the General Assembly pushed 
France "to redress the legitimate grievances of the Algerian prisoners in recognizing their status as 
political prisoners" (UN "Status of Algerians").  
While the exact meaning of the codification of the notion of self-determination in international 
human rights instruments may be arguable, the international promotion of self-determination for the 
peoples of Algeria should be understood as expressing a commitment to a new genre of narration in 
an international setting. Peoples, as collectives, were granted the ability to narrate their own stories, 
in contrast to the imposition of the traditional individual versus society/state genres. This commitment 
to self-determination as narrative appears first in Article 1(2) of the UN Charter. The United Nations 
declared its commitment to narratability over violence specifically in the preamble to the Universal 
Declaration, where the General Assembly recognized the dangers of suppressing the voice of both the 
individual and collectives: "it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last 
resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule 
of law." While Algeria was taking advantage of this new international setting, the French were 
parochially ignoring even their own domestic law regarding the minimum rights of individuals. The 
1946 French Constitution, as well as the 1958 French Constitution, relied on and referenced the DRMC 
as the basis for their codes of governance. Bedjaoui, presenting a legal analysis arguing that France 
had already implicitly recognized the independence of Algeria, explains that the 1946 French 
Constitution "gave all international conventions duly ratified by the French Parliament precedence over 
French municipal laws and regulations" (212). France had codified the authority of the Universal 
Declaration in its domestic law. Ironically, Maran notes that "the government, acted for by its legal 
advisers and diplomats, did not refer to this [international] body of law. Nor indeed, with odd 
exceptions, did the intellectuals who opposed the government's actions on torture" (43). In fact, 
because of the silencing nature of the crimes of colonialism, specifically torture and summary 
executions, the French Penal Code was rarely invoked by victims of those crimes even though the 
Code Penal, Crimes et Delits clearly outlawed torture and arbitrary arrest in those cases (39). The law 
also prescribed the death penalty for those committing torture). In order to foster a more thorough 
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understanding of how the indifference to the French law, and to the international law ratified by 
parliament, promoted human rights abuses and effectively silenced both the French and the French 
Algerian populations, this analysis turns to an examination of one of the rare cases where a tortured 
Algerian pressed the domestic French law into service. 
 During the Algerian War, the French-Algerian police and the French military began 
systematically employing torture in their attempt to retain the Algerian colony. In 1957, during the 
Battle of Algiers, the military abducted and tortured two French journalists, Maurice Audin and Henri 
Alleg (Audin was killed while "attempting to escape" and Alleg was later released). Leftist French 
intellectuals (including Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and François Mauriac) 
immediately decried the use of torture against one of their own in major newspapers and, notably, in 
Sartre's journal, Les temps modernes. In 1958, General de Gaulle responded to public pressure by 
announcing that torture would end with the establishment of the Fifth Republic. The outcry was 
intense but short-lived as André Malraux, then French Minister of Culture, added his voice to de 
Gaulle's, rather blindly proclaiming that "torture is no longer employed in Algeria" (de Beauvoir and 
Halimi 61). Those in the business of publishing episodes from the war, however, had evidence that the 
tortures had not ceased. Despite government attempts to censor his voice by banning his book, Alleg 
published a best-selling account of his torture under the title The Question. In the introduction to the 
book, Sartre stresses the importance of the voice at the scene of torture (29). The role of the victim's 
voice was later recognized in official UN instruments when, in the 1975 Declaration on the Protection 
From Torture, the General Assembly clarified its use of the term "torture": "For the purpose of this 
Declaration, torture means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is 
intentionally inflicted by or at the instigation of a public official on a person for such purposes as 
obtaining from him or a third person information or confession, punishing him for an act he has 
committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating him or other persons" (art. 1). 
However, during the period of colonization, public revelations of torture were fairly rare in 
metropolitan France, and even rarer were legal cases charging the military with the crime of torture. 
The public was, therefore, relatively silent on the issue of torture. After the initial outcry over Alleg's 
torture, general outrage did not resurface until 1960 with the revelation in Le Monde that the French 
military had tortured a twenty-two year old Algerian woman named Djamila Boupacha in El Biar, the 
same prison where Audin and Alleg had been detained three years earlier (see Crouzet 47; de 
Beauvoir 6). 
 On the night of 10 February 1960, Algerian security forces burst into the home of the 
Boupacha family. They arrested Djamila, her sister Nefissa, her brother-in-law Abdelli Ahmed, and her 
father Abdelaziz. The arresting officers took the family to the military barracks at El Biar. That night, 
separated from the other members of her family, Djamila Boupacha was interrogated. A captain in the 
French military asked her repeatedly for information about various Algerian nationalists, striking her 
across the face and slamming her head into a wall when she provided no response. She was taken to 
another room and subjected to three hours of torture by electricity. By morning, she had "admitted" 
that she received Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) agents in her house, but she said she had no 
idea about their present location (see de Beauvoir and Halimi 116). For the next few days, Boupacha 
was pulled repeatedly from her cell to respond to questioning. She admitted freely that she was a 
militant member of the FLN and had participated in medical relief for the agents of the independence 
movement. When asked to express regret for her actions, she refused and was violently beaten. On 
17 February, she was moved to the Centre at Hussein Dey where she was again subjected to torture 
by electric shock treatment. More than nine torturers were present (some colonial police, some French 
military) when she was stripped and lashed into a dentist chair. The questions about her brother's 
whereabouts were repeated while the officers drank beer, "which they spat over her in mouthfuls till 
her body was all dripping wet" (39). Continuing the questions, a few of the men attached electrical 
wires to her nipples, her anus, and her vagina. They shouted that they would make her talk. Despite 
not having provided answers to their questions, the torture finally ceased and she was returned to her 
cell, covered with electrical and cigarette burns. Three days later, she was awakened in the middle of 
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the night and ushered into a nearby courtyard. After being stripped, Boupacha's ankles and wrists 
were tied together, and a wooden pole was passed between her knees and elbows. The French 
paratroopers then placed the pole across a bathtub, leaving Boupacha hanging face down in the water. 
"[The inspectors] upbraided her for planting bombs in cafés and causing the deaths of women and 
children … Her torturers now started dragging in all the most recent outrages committed in public 
places in Algiers. She confessed to them all" (40). Not satisfied with her multiple confessions (her 
torturers knew that the "perpetrators" of some of the crimes had already been tried and convicted), 
the soldiers renewed their efforts with increased ferocity. "the inspector who had beaten her . . . 
tipped her over in the bath, forced her legs apart and pushed the handle of a tooth-brush into her 
vagina. This done, they took one of the beer-bottles they had emptied, and crammed it up her, neck 
first" (40). Boupacha later told her lawyer, Gisèle Halimi, that "they wanted me to say I had planted a 
bomb in Algiers" (40).  
 Halimi, restricted from appearing at the Algiers courts by the Algerian authorities' 
manipulations of visa laws, contacted Simone de Beauvoir, one of her domestic clients, and asked her 
to write an article detailing the ordeal. De Beauvoir's story, "Pour Djamila Boupacha," appeared in Le 
Monde on 2 June 1960. The entire edition was confiscated by military authorities in Algeria and caused 
such a stir in France that letters poured in for weeks. The ordeal brought the discussion of the use of 
torture to the editorial pages of all major publications. In June 1960, France was so thoroughly 
immersed in Boupacha's situation that Halimi was able to declare that "Djamila Boupacha has become 
a familiar figure … We talk about her as a little sister who testifies to the future about a system that 
functions only through dishonor and ferocity" (Halimi, "D'Henri Alleg" 15). In the metropolitan French 
mind, torture became intrinsically linked with the colonizing mission. Boupacha's ordeal can be 
examined by analyzing the ways in which torture attempts to destroy a voice, to force a human being 
to attest to the power of the state. Sartre attempts to explain the political conditions and the 
philosophical conceptions that brought about the state's reliance on torture: "the 'forces of order,' 
hindered by their own might, have no defense against guerrillas except punitive expeditions and 
reprisals, no defense against terrorism but terror. Everybody, everywhere, is hiding something. They 
must be made to talk" (Sartre, "Introduction" 29). The torture, while directed most manifestly at 
Boupacha's body, was also clearly an attempt to employ her voice against herself. 
In the service of clarifying the relationship between torture and the production of narrative as it 
participates in subject construction, Elaine Scarry provides an important analysis of the function of 
torture. While Michel Foucault claims that by the end of the eighteenth century changes in the penal 
codes brought about the "disappearance of punishment as spectacle" (7), Scarry's analysis of 
contemporary torture argues that torture, even as an ostensibly secret practice, is still used as a 
means of public control in many areas of the world. In the Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of 
the World, she offers a definition, or formulation, of torture: "while torture contains language, specific 
human words and sounds, it is itself a language, an objectification, an acting out" (27). To understand 
her formulation, one must examine the nature of language and objectification as Scarry herself figures 
their relationship to the human creative processes.  
Ñacuñán Sáez, in an article entitled "Torture: A Discourse on Practice" argues that the expressive 
language of the torture victim "comes from a body which is still (or already) controlled by the laws of 
language. … The pain inflicted by contemporary torture does not break down a pre-existing subject. … 
It produces the subject as already (or still) absent" (138). Torture fashions a nonentity out of the 
tortured's subjectivity. It destroys memory by numbing the mind with pain, denying the victim the 
possibility of reconstructing an integral self through thought. More insidiously, however, torture 
destroys the victim's linguistic systems, undermining any direct correlation between the signifier and 
the signified. Sáez calls torture the "realm of the pure signifier," and argues that once the distinction 
between truth and falsity has been destroyed, "anything is equal to anything," and therefore, only 
pure signifiers with no relation to a signified remain (133). Sáez's astute assessment of torture's 
destructive capacity implies that torture directly attacks the victims' ability to narrate (or even think) a 
coherent self image. Torture targets the subject's ability to narrate her experience by fracturing 
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integrating linguistic structures through "the question" and confession. When torturers are attempting 
to fragment their victims' subjectivity, they resort to a violent destruction of the signifier-signified 
relationship. For the victim of torture, language fails to function; the tortured often has little or no 
access to the information that the torturers earnestly claim to need. Instead, the torture victim can 
only provide irrational responses (e.g., Boupacha's confession to all the major crimes of her day) to 
the torturers' questions. Yet, even in the performativity of her response, the victim cannot be certain 
that any response will bring about the cessation of pain. 
In Scarry's understanding, torture is employed by an institution as a form of "analogical 
substantiation" of its power when the establishment perceives a crisis in society and its beliefs (13-
14). Analogical substantiation converts the pain of the body undergoing torture into "the fiction of 
absolute power" (27). Torture accomplishes this substantiation by destroying the individual's ability to 
produce language with her voice. More insidiously, the system of torture replaces the tortured's voice 
with a voice supplied by the torturer that, read by the torturing institution, confirms and produces the 
power of that institution. Because the body is "the locus of pain" and the voice "the locus of power" 
(51), Scarry argues that the production of power is possible because the torturer makes the body 
"emphatically and crushingly present by destroying it" and the voice "absent by destroying it" (49). In 
this formulation, the fictitious nature of this power comes from the ability to objectify and distance 
one's self from the body in pain, or rather the inability not to objectify and not to distance one's self 
from the body in pain. This torturing-as-production does something more than "make everyone aware, 
through the body of the criminal, of the unrestrained presence of the sovereign" (Foucault 49). 
Torture also produces a voice that makes claims about the power of the torturer and the torturing 
state. Many analysts who have attempted to detail the functioning of torture have noted that the 
pervasiveness of the silence produced goes beyond the destroyed subjectivity of the immediate victim. 
Rather, the torturers and the establishment which supports them are also forced into oppressive 
silence. In 1970, Andrée Bruyère, a French author who interviewed Boupacha, publicly praised her for 
this insight concerning the torturer's human dignity: "Djamila didn't ignore the fact that torture 
doesn't strike just the victims. Its effects are even more pernicious on the spirit, the comportment of 
those who participate … destroyed in what should be held the most noble, their sense of human 
dignity" (Brunel, Bruyère, Dominique, and Riffaud 103). Bruyère elaborates by quoting the core of 
Boupacha's insight: "the best are lost in an abyss of regrets, the others look for more radical ways to 
forget" (qtd. in Brunel, Bruyère, Dominique, and Riffaud 104). The effects of torture not only silence 
the victim, but in addition, according to Boupacha, Scarry, and many others, participation in torture 
typically relegates the torturer to the realm of voiceless silence. It is against both of these silences 
that the narrative of human rights attempts to provide public, international space for a voice. 
 In 1985, the international human rights community recognized the linguistic devastation 
caused by torture when the United Nations drafted the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel 
and Unusual Punishments. In Article 15, the Convention requires that "each State Party shall ensure 
that any statement which is established to have been made as a result of torture shall not be invoked 
as evidence in any proceedings, except against a person accused of torture as evidence that the 
statement was made." The United Nations codified the importance of the voice in a new context, 
investing the empty linguistic systems of the torture victim with a redefined power to narrate. That is, 
the tortured voice can legally narrate the destruction of that voice as evidence against the torturer. 
 Many French supporters of self-determination for Algeria, and of the rights of the individual in 
the face of torture, continued after the war to describe "the question of Algeria" in terms reflecting the 
rationalization for the colonial mission. French legal expert Pierre Cot, in his preface to Bedjaoui's 
book, explained his understanding of France's beneficial influence on Algeria: "It is not only by having 
aided men like Dr. Bedjaoui to find themselves, or even for having taught Algerian children a 
Declaration of the Human Rights of men and citizens … that France has made a contribution to the 
movement for liberation among the Algerian people. It is more directly by the development of 
colonialism and by the abuses inherent in colonial domination; by its opposition first of all to any 
affirmation of Algerian personality and then to even the shadow of independence" (3-4). Recalling 
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Sartre's statement that we become what we are only through the radical refusal of what others 
impose, Cot identifies awkwardly the narrative of becoming against the worst of odds as an ultimately 
beneficial product of the colonial legacy. It is unlikely that the narrative of becoming was a gift from 
the French to the Algerians. That notion merely replicates the logic of the civilizing mission. Rather, it 
is important to understand that the narrative of becoming, despite cultural differences and subtleties 
in various contexts, is a global genre. 
I have argued that international human rights law can be understood as a commitment to the 
voice, as the tool to guarantee recourse to individual narration. Human rights law implicitly, although 
often explicitly as well, commits contemporary states to an ideological understanding of human 
subjectivity that privileges the power of speaking oneself. However, as Neil Stammers has pointed out 
in a recent critique of contemporary human rights theory, the current bases for human rights "must be 
superseded by a reconstructed notion of human rights, systematically grounded and understood to 
challenge existing power relations" (508). He identifies the current theoretical justifications with 
continued global abuses of human rights and calls for a notion of human rights "that enables, not 
disables, those whose voices are currently stifled by the dominant western discourses on human 
rights." While postmodern theory posits the unknowability of the self, because subjectivity is a nexus 
of complex relationships, the testimony offered by victims of human rights abuses tends to suggest 
that, even if the subject is ultimately unknowable, the individual, through self-narration, experiences 
herself as a distinct spatio-historical being. Fanon attempted to reassure his shell-shocked Algerian 
patients by explaining that "the consciousness of the self is not the closing of a door to 
communication. Philosophic thought teaches us, on the contrary, that it is its guarantee" (247). This 
sense of distinctness, of being conscious of the self, is precisely what human rights law should 
promote. Understanding international human rights law as a commitment to narratability allows the 
individual, in the international community, to challenge the oppressive power dynamics confronting 
her. It accounts for the evolving nature of human rights in our contemporary, international society. As 
we better understand what a subject needs to be able to tell her story, we can evaluate entitlements 
and prohibitions for their effectiveness in guaranteeing the ability to self-narrate. Thus, while civil and 
political rights might be the first guarantees for the right to narration, economic and social rights 
become important for understanding that an individual requires fair wages and safe working conditions 
to tell her story. The right to narration is not merely the right to tell one's story, it is the right to 
control representation. According to Seyla Benhabib, Hannah Arendt identified the process of narration 
as intrinsically caught up in the active dynamism of self-representation. Benhabib concludes from her 
reading of Arendt's The Human Condition that the "narrative structure of action determines the 
identity of the self" (187). She argues that Arendt's narrative evolves into "political theory as story 
telling" (196). Thus, the dynamic nature of human subjectivity requires an equally dynamic process of 
narration for representation. When the torturer destroys the voice and then forces the voice to 
acknowledge its own destruction, the torturer is, perhaps unwittingly, attesting to the importance of 
narration. So too, a United Nations that codifies the plot of an international Bildungsroman in its 
conventions, declarations, and resolutions. 
 
Note: The above paper is a modified version of Joseph R. Slaughter, "A Question of Narration: The 
Voice in International Human Rights Law" in Human Rights Quarterly 19.2 (1997): 406-30. 
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